Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power since he took the helm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012 reflects not just personal ambition but also long-standing party anxieties about corruption and social stability. By ratcheting up repression, Xi is responsible for the first significant increase in long-term political risk in China since the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4th, 1989. 

After my trip to Beijing two weeks ago, I have become more concerned about mounting political, geopolitical and economic risk in China.  

As soon as Xi became CCP general secretary, the position which gives him ultimate power in China, he launched a relentless and wide-ranging anti-corruption campaign. Institutionally, Xi beefed up the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the party organ tasked with enforcing internal rules and combatting graft. 

He transformed what had been patchy on-again, off-again efforts into a permanent crusade against malfeasance. He proclaimed that the CCDI would be “striking tigers and flies at the same time” – a reference to both high-ranking and low-ranking officials - and charged Wang Qishan, his most trusted ally, with heading the commission. It has become one of the most powerful and feared arms of the party. 

Cleansing the party’s ranks of venal officials has been an effective way for Xi to silence his political opponents and consolidate power. 

One side-effect has been a deep reluctance, verging on paralysis, among some policymakers and bureaucrats to take the initiative for fear of being accused of feathering their own nests. There is also increased reluctance to bring bad news to the attention of the leadership. 

By the time of the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, as many as 2.7m people had been investigated on a variety of corruption charges, more than 1.5m had been punished and 58,000 had gone on trial. Those accused of bribery by the CCDI are first dismissed from their posts and face internal party prosecution (shuang gui). They may be held incognito for months. Many are then expelled from the party and referred to the criminal justice system for prosecution, ending nearly inevitably with a guilty verdict. 

Importantly, Xi hasn’t spared the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police (PAP) from a thorough purge. This has been probably the most difficult part of his power grab. 

The anti-corruption campaign even brought down two sitting members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the party body chaired by Xi which guides the PLA. General Zhang Yang, who oversaw political work in the PLA, committed suicide before he could face questioning over bribery allegations in November 2017. General Fang Fenghui, who headed the PLA joint command, was sentenced to life in prison in February this year.  

The CCDI is supposed to probe only party members, so a new, even bigger, anti-corruption body was created in March 2018 - the National Supervision Commission (NSC). This new state agency, working in parallel with the CCDI, has augmented oversight over millions of civil servants as well as managers of state-owned enterprises and other entities spanning the gamut from science to sport; it even has purview over grassroots residents’ committees. 

At the 19th Party Congress and then again in January 2018 at the second plenary session of the 19th CCDI, Xi claimed that the “crushing blows” delivered as part of the anti-corruption crackdown had led to a “sweeping victory”; the party was now consolidating its success in China’s long war with graft. 

But less than a year later, at the CCDI’s third plenum in January 2019, Xi warned that victory in fact was not yet complete. He called for the struggle to continue with unabated vigour. 

In his address, Xi stressed the party’s eternal bottom line – loyalty to the party and its leaders. All officials, with the CCDI taking the lead, must “resolutely safeguard the authority and leadership of the CCP Central Committee” and Xi’s status at its core. The speech left no doubt that the anti-corruption crusade is about maintaining the party and Xi in power as well as fighting China’s pervasive problems with graft. 

In just his first term, Xi won party agreement to dispense with the established custom limiting the general secretary to two five-year terms. Accordingly, no successor was appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee as part of the personnel reshuffle during the 19th Party Congress. Xi then secured approval to make himself president for life at the National People’s Congress in March 2018 by abolishing the two-term limit on the presidency. 

Xi has managed to amass political power to a degree unseen since Mao and has now become communist China’s most powerful leader. 

Chairman Mao had more internal political control but presided over a ravaged economy, whereas Xi oversees a country that has become an economic and technological giant. And throughout this time, he has been relentlessly building a personality cult reminiscent of Mao’s even if it is still far less intense. 

The events over the past seven years have led the Enodo team to conclude the following:

• By dramatically weakening political opposition and dispensing with the Politburo collegiality agreed on post-Mao to safeguard against overreaching personal power, Xi has eroded the basis for the transfer of power. This will make the eventual transition harder to achieve, frustrating those waiting for their turn at the top  
• In tackling corruption and vested interests standing in the way of further economic reform, Xi has been implementing a consensus agenda within the party leadership. But he has gone further than everyone had expected and has created a climate of uncertainty and fear 
• In such an environment it is easier for the leadership to make policy mistakes as few are prepared to speak out if their views differ. Xi and his closest allies exist in an echo chamber, so valuable intelligence which does not reflect their own views may not make it to the top   
• Xi’s ruthless anti-corruption tactics have made him many powerful enemies. His 180-degree turn on economic policy, extolling frugality as a virtue and sharpening the focus on the maintenance of social stability, is changing economic incentives across the board
• Xi’s continuous quest to reaffirm his power reflects his and the party’s insecurities. As China’s well-educated and well-travelled middle class grows, so could demands for democratisation. The CCP and Xi’s position as its leader are secure at present, but the steady increase in repression may well feed the political instability he fears the most
• The party has increasingly sought to portray itself as the natural successor to China’s dynastic tradition. With Communist rule in China viewed as a continuation of its dynastic past, it’s worth remembering that while some of China’s dynasties, such as the Han and the Tang, were stable and lasted a long time, others, such as the Song and the Ming, were rather weak and unstable and their fall was preceded by political infighting and internal strife